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There is a large scientific interest in human moral judgments. However, little is known
about the developmental origins and the specific role of the primary caregivers in the
early development of inter-individual differences in human morality. Here, we assess the
moral intuitions of 3- to 6-year-old children and their mothers (N = 56), using child-
friendly versions of five trolley dilemmas and two control scenarios. We found that
children responded to moral dilemmas similar to their mothers, revealed by correlations
between the responses of mothers and their children in all five moral dilemmas and a
highly similar overall response pattern between mother and child across all judgments.
This was revealed by a high agreement in the response pattern of children and
their mothers. Furthermore, children’s overall response tendencies were similar to the
response tendencies of adults. Thus, similar moral principles (e.g., the Doctrine of the
Double Effect) which have been identified in adults, and describes as a universal moral
grammar, may guide the moral intuitions in early childhood already. Taken together, the
present findings provide the first evidence that children’s moral intuitions are closely
associated with the moral intuitions of their mother.
Keywords: moral cognition, trolley dilemma, moral development, universal moral grammar theory, parental
influence
INTRODUCTION
Philosophical thought experiments on moral intuitions have recently been of great scientific and
public interest (Mikhail, 2007; Miller, 2008; Bonnefon et al., 2016; Awad et al., 2018), and are taken
as indicators for human basic moral principles. While Trolley scenarios, the most widely applied
moral dilemma, have been intensely investigated in millions of adults (Mikhail, 2007, 2009; Awad
et al., 2018), very little is known about how children judge these dilemmas and how inter-individual
differences in moral intuitions develop in early childhood.
In the standard version of the trolley problem, participants are asked to judge the following
two scenarios: First, in the Footbridge dilemma, a person is standing on a footbridge and observes
a group of five people walking along the train tracks below. When the observer notices that the
group is about to be hit by a runaway train, the only way to save the five people would be that
the observer shoves a heavy person standing beside the observer off the bridge. This would stop
the train and kill the heavy person but save the lives of the five people on the tracks (Thomson,
1985). Usually a minority of participants, about 10–15%, judge this action of the observer as morally
acceptable (Greene et al., 2001; Mikhail, 2007, 2009). By contrast, in the Bystander version of the
trolley dilemma, the observer can throw a switch and redirect the train onto another track, with
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only one person walking on it, but that person would then be
killed by the train (Foot, 1967). While the outcome of both
scenarios remains the same (saving five at the cost of one), the
large majority of adult participants, about 90%, agree that in the
Bystander dilemma, the switch should be pulled to redirect the
train (Mikhail, 2007, 2009).
The different response tendencies across the dilemmas are
commonly explained by the interplay of three deontic principles
that indicate an underlying universal moral grammar (UMG)
(Cushman et al., 2006): First, the Action Principle claims that
harm caused by action is morally worse than harm caused by
omission (e.g., shoving the big man from the bridge is morally
worse than doing nothing). Second, the Contact Principle states
that using physical contact to cause harm to a victim is morally
worse than causing similar harm without using physical contact
(e.g., shoving the big man from the bridge is morally worse
than pulling a switch). Finally, the Doctrine of the Double Effect
(DDE) argues that harm intended as means to a goal is morally
worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal (e.g., shoving
a man from the bridge is an intentional action and cannot be
interpreted as a side effect, in contrast to pulling a switch).
The general applicability and consistency of the UMG is
underlined by the comprehensive work of John Mikhail and
colleagues, who tested over 200,000 participants from more than
120 countries (Hauser et al., 2007; Mikhail, 2007, 2009; Miller,
2008). Based on their results, the UMG framework proposes
that all humans possess innate tacit knowledge of a variety of
legal rules and principles (including those mentioned above),
and those are automatically applied to morally relevant situations
(Hauser et al., 2007; Mikhail, 2007). Beyond the three principles
mentioned above, human morality is assumed to be constituted
by a larger conglomerate of deontic rules.
A great body of research, following the tradition of Jean
Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, has investigated children’s
understanding of norms regarding justice, fairness, and equality
and the development of moral reasoning from preschool age on
(i.e., the retrospective explanations given for moral judgments)
(Kohlberg, 1966; Turiel, 1966, 1983; Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969;
Nucci and Turiel, 1978). However, these studies apply real-life
scenarios and cannot be directly compared to moral intuitions
tested in Trolley scenarios and thus to the principles of a UMG
as tested in the adult literature. Therefore, we here refer to
moral intuitions (a term often used in the literature testing UMG
principles (Hauser et al., 2007; Mikhail, 2007; Pellizzoni et al.,
2010)) as spontaneous ad hoc reactions about the moral quality of
a certain action or the omission of this action in a moral dilemma.
This is, different to the focus of Kohlberg or Piaget on the
argumentative justification for moral decisions, the focus lies here
on the differential moral intuitions in different moral dilemma.
A first study on children’s moral intuitions about Trolley
scenarios found that preschool children and adults may judge
these dilemmas similarly; namely, they advocate pulling the
switch in the Bystander scenario, but not in the Footbridge case
(Pellizzoni et al., 2010). Another study extended these findings
and found that 10-year-old children respond somewhat more
utilitarian (i.e., preferring the greater good) in trolley scenarios
in contrast to adolescents and adults (Bucciarelli, 2015). These
studies only tested two scenarios (Bystander vs. Footbridge) used
by Mikhail et al. (Mikhail, 2009), or focused exclusively on
school-aged children (Bucciarelli, 2015). In the present study,
we used a more extensive set of the commonly applied Trolley
scenarios to assess the early development of preschool children’s
spontaneous moral judgment and tested whether preschoolers
already judge according to the core principles of the UMG
(Mikhail, 2009).
Several theoretical approaches in moral psychology propose
that human morality is channeled by social influences (Kohlberg,
1966; Damon and Killen, 1982; Haidt, 2001), with a specific role
of the family context (Eisenberg and Valiente, 2002). The UMG
advocates propose that innate components are foundational to
moral intuitions, but also leave room for social and cultural
influences on moral intuitions. However, the UMG advocates do
not specify the mechanisms that lead to inter-individual variation
in moral preferences. To our knowledge, no study compared the
moral intuitions of children and their mothers.
Here, we addressed this issue and for the first time, assessed
the impact of the family context on the development of the child’s
moral preferences. The family context might be one of the critical
factors that explain inter-individual variation in moral intuitions.
Furthermore, it is still unclear if influences of caregivers in early
moral development go beyond real-life scenarios and generalize
to abstract scenarios like the Trolley dilemma. Thus, we tested the
moral intuition of children and their mothers, to see whether they
are associated with children’s intuitions on Trolley dilemmas.
In the present study, we advance our understanding on
early development of children’s UMG. First, we extend former
research on preschoolers’ moral intuitions and their use of the
deontic principles beyond scenarios formerly applied in children.
Second, we test if moral preferences of children are related to the
preferences of their mothers across a variety of moral scenarios.
Our main hypotheses were that moral judgments may be very
similar in children like in adults, and that they are constituted
in the proximate family context, and, as a consequence, that




Participants were 56 mother–child dyads from a German urban
middle class context (28 girls, 28 boys, Mage = 5.0 years;
SDage = 1.0 years, age range: 3.4–6.6 years), recruited via
kindergartens. The experimental procedure was conducted in
accordance with the World Medical Association’s Declaration
of Helsinki (59th WMA general assembly, Seoul, 2008) and
informed written consent was obtained from each participant.
According to the regulations on freedom of research in the
German Constitution (§5 (3)), and the German University Law
(§30), this study did not require a separate vote by a local
Institutional Review Board.
Additional dyads did not complete all tasks and were thus
excluded from further analysis. This was because children
were not attentive (n = 2), not willing to cooperate with the
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experimenter (n = 1), had language difficulties (n = 1) or because
mothers did not return their questionnaires (n = 11).
Materials and Procedure
Each child was tested in a quiet room in the kindergarten;
the test took approximately 15 min. Mothers received the
dilemma questionnaire 4 to 6 months later. All mothers
were tested on the same trolley dilemmas as their children.
They received illustrated paper versions of the dilemmas,
including a dilemma description, identical to the illustrations
and dilemma descriptions presented to the children. All
mothers were instructed, and confirmed by signature, to
answer the questionnaire by oneself without consulting any
other person. Questionnaires were returned to a post box in
the kindergarten.
In the warm-up phase, the experimenter encouraged the child
to tell them about their day. To introduce the experiment, the
experimenter asked children whether they liked to hear some
stories in which they could decide how the story should end.
Each child was presented five moral dilemmas and two
control scenarios, adapted from Mikhail3. The focus was
on the five moral dilemmas; the Bystander, Footbridge,
Drop Man, Implied Consent, and Expensive Equipment
dilemmas (see Figure 1A and description in Table 1). The
Disproportional Death and Costless Rescue scenario (see
Figure 2A and description in Table 1) were not relevant for
our main hypothesis but were assessed as control scenarios,
to test whether parents and children were attentive and
understood the overall structure of the scenarios. To avoid
potential gender biases, the gender of the protagonist
was matched to the gender of the child. Furthermore,
protagonists were given names different from any child in
the kindergarten group.
For children, all scenarios were presented in a randomized
order on a laptop, using PowerPoint (Version 2016, Microsoft).
The experimenter explained the plot of the dilemma to the
children; the rationale for the seven stories is explained in
Table 1 (see Supplementary Material for the full dilemma
descriptions). We used control questions up to two times
to ensure that children were attentive and understood the
basic plot (Control question 1: “Can the children see the
ball rolling down the hill?”; Control question 2: “Is this
kid seeing the ball rolling down the hill?”). All children
responded appropriately. After the scenario was explained and
shown visually to the children, the experimenter explained,
for example, in the Bystander scenario: “If the ball will be
FIGURE 1 | Overview of the trolley dilemma responses. (A) The five moral dilemmas shown to mother and child. (B) Responses of mothers and children. Bars
indicate the percentage of responses that advocate intervention (yes in percent). Whiskers indicate SE. Asterisks indicate the results of McNemar’s tests.
(C) Correspondence between maternal and children’s advocation for intervention (yes) and for omission (no). Agreements (green) and disagreements (red) between
mother–child dyads, with the corresponding correlation coefficient. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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TABLE 1 | Dilemma rationale.
Scenario description
Moral dilemma
Bystander The ball is threatening a group of five children. The agent can redirect the ball onto a side track and thereby save the group from the collision
but will hurt one single child.
Footbridge In contrast to the Bystander case, the only chance to save the five children is to shove a child with a big backpack from the bridge. Thereby
that child clashes with the ball and stops it but gets hurt at the same time.
Drop Man In contrast to the Footbridge scenario, the only way to save the five children is to activate a trapdoor by remote through which the child with
the backpack falls onto the tracks.
Implied Consent In this scenario, a single child is threatened by the ball. The agent can shove the child out of the ball’s way and thereby save the child from
getting hurt badly, but the child will still get hurt slightly.
Expensive Equipment In this scenario, the ball is about to crash into a pile of toys. The only way to save the toys is to redirect the ball onto a side track, where a
single child would get hurt by the collision with the ball.
Control dilemma
Costless Rescue This control condition is similar to the Bystander case. However, no child is standing on the side track, wherefore redirecting the ball does
not result in any harm.
Disproportional Death In this control condition, the ball is threatening a single child. Redirecting the ball onto the side track would result in harming five children.
See Supplementary Material for the original description of all scenarios.
redirected to the side, this child will get hurt, but the other
five children will be saved.” The child was then asked the
same test question in all scenarios: “What should Tom/Marie
do? Redirect the ball to the side or do nothing?” Therefore,
responses were choices for action or for omission. Children
(and mothers) responded properly by naming either the action
(Redirect the ball) which we labeled as a “Yes” response in
Figure 1B or the omission (do nothing), which we labeled as a
“No” response.
Statistical Analysis
To test the overall match between the responses of the
mother and the child, we conducted an agreement pattern
permutation test: The mean agreement between mother and
child in the actual sample was tested against the permutation
distribution of random mother–child dyads. Specifically, we
took the percentage of responses of mothers and their
children, which mother and child agreed on (e.g., 60%, if
3 of 5 responses were identical) and compared this to the
percentage of responses to 1000 samples of randomly assigned
mother–child pairs. That is, we permuted the 56 mother–
child allocations 1000 times to estimate the distribution of
a chance agreement for random mother–child combinations.
A z test was then used to test the difference of the
agreement in the current sample from the chance distribution
(percent of agreements in the random mother–child pairs, as
estimated in the permutation test). This way, we compared
the agreement in responses of actual mother–child dyads
of our sample to a chance agreement, which would occur
in randomly assigned mother–child dyads. Note that this
chance level estimate effectively controls for the unequal
distribution of yes and no responses in each of the dilemma,
because it considers the agreements within each dilemma
for both the actual and the random mother–child pairs. To
determine whether the Doctrine of the Double Effect affected
the responses of mothers and children, we compared the
Bystander and the Drop Man dilemma by using a McNemar’s
test. To test whether the Contact Principle was in effect,
we compared the Footbridge and the Drop Man dilemma.
Since this was the first study of its sort, testing moral
judgments in mothers and their children, we did not conduct
an a priori power analysis so results of post hoc sensitivity
power analysis are reported for correlations (Faul et al., 2009).
Furthermore, we calculated confidence intervals by converting
r to Fisher’s z′, computing the regarding confidence intervals
and converting these back using the inverse Fisher’s z′ transform
(Beaulieu-Prévost, 2006). Note that, in scenerios where the
child or the mother did not respond to a specific scenario




The moral dilemmas and the responses are displayed in
Figures 1A,B. We conducted binominal tests against 50%
chance level for children and mothers separately for each
dilemma. Both mothers and their children advocated to act
in the Bystander and the Implied Consent dilemma, all
ps < 0.001 (binominal test against the 50% chance level).
Mothers rather refrained from intervention in the Footbridge,
the Drop Man, and the Expensive Equipment dilemmas, all
ps < 0.058, while the response of children did not show
a clear tendency in these dilemmas, all ps > 0.081. The
dilemma-specific differences in responses between mother
and child are displayed in Figure 1B, indicating higher
tendencies for intervention in the situation by children in three
of five scenarios.
Comparing preschoolers’ responses to the Drop Man
and the Bystander dilemmas, the McNemar’s test reached
significance (McNemar’s test = 4.81, p < 0.019), indicating
that children’s responses follow the Doctrine of the
Double Effect. The comparison between the Footbridge
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FIGURE 2 | Overview of the control scenarios. (A) The two non-moral control
scenarios shown to mother and child. (B) Responses of mothers and children.
Bars represent the percentage of responses that advocate intervention (yes in
percent). Whiskers indicate SE. Asterisks indicate the results of McNemar’s
tests. (C) Correspondence between maternal and children’s advocation for
intervention (yes) and for omission (no). Agreements (green) and
disagreements (red) of the mother–child dyads with the corresponding
correlation coefficient. ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
dilemma and the Drop Man scenario did not reach
significance (McNemar’s test = 20.26, p = 1.000), which
indicates that the Contact Principle is not in effect.
For mothers, both comparisons reached significance, all
ps < 0.013, which clearly indicates that the Double Effect
and the Contact Principle are in effect when mothers
judge moral dilemmas.
Correlations With Age
Looking at the correlations with age, children’s tendencies
to act in the scenarios increased with age in the Footbridge,
the Drop Man, and the Implied Consent dilemma, all
r > 0.292, all p < 0.029, but not in the Bystander and
the Expensive Equipment dilemmas, both r < 0.246,
all p> 0.067.
Mother–Child Agreement
The agreement and disagreement pattern of mother–child dyads
for each dilemma is displayed in Figure 1C. The correlation
between the responses of mothers and their children were
significant and highly consistent for all five dilemmas (Bystander:
r = 0.364, p = 0.006, R2 = 0.132, 1 − β = 0.839, 95% CI
[0.119, 0.567]; Footbridge: r = 0.336, p = 0.012, R2 = 0.113,
1 − β = 0.768, 95% CI [0.087, 0.545]; Expensive Equipment:
r = 0.404, p = 0.002, R2 = 0.163, 1 − β = 0.920, 95% CI [0.167,
0.597]; Implied Consent: r = 0.377, p = 0.004, R2 = 0.142, 1 −
β = 0.867, 95% CI [0.134, 0.577]; Drop Man: r = 0.360, p = 0.007,
R2 = 0.130, 1 − β = 0.830, 95% CI [0.115, 0.564]). The overall
agreement in the response pattern between mother and child
was 71.1%, and was markedly above chance agreement (57.5%),
z = 5.56, p < 0.001 (corresponding to 5.56 SDs above the mean
of the permutation distribution). Note that this is the result
of a non-parametric test against a chance agreement pattern
(of random mother–child dyads) and therefore controls for the
unequal distributions of yes and no responses in each scenario
(see Section “Statistical Analysis” for details). The agreement
between mother and child did not increase or decrease with
child’s age r = 0.051, all p = 0.709.
Control Scenarios
In the control scenarios, mothers and children responded
as expected in both dilemmas, opting for the rescue (see
Figures 2B,C), all ps < 0.011. The responses of mothers and
children were not correlated for Costless Rescue r = 0.018,
p = 0.899, R2 = 0.000, 1 − β = 0.052, 95% CI [-0.237, 0.271] and
significantly correlated for the Disproportional Death condition
r = 0.701, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.491, 1 − β = 0.999, 95% CI [0.530,
0.818]. Note that due to the clear tendencies in responses, this
correlation is driven by two matches of “yes” responses and thus
not further interpreted.
DISCUSSION
The present results provide first evidence that children
respond to moral dilemmas very similar like their mothers.
This is indicated by the consistent agreement between
the moral judgments of mothers and children in all five
moral dilemmas and the similarity of the overall response
pattern between children and adults, as revealed by the
response pattern permutation test. Furthermore, this is
the first study that applied a broad set of trolley scenarios
of the original studies at this early age (Mikhail, 2007).
The findings confirm our main hypotheses that children
respond to moral dilemmas like their mothers and our
data suggest that preschoolers make use of similar deontic
principles like adults. Furthermore, similar to a former study
(Bucciarelli, 2015), children showed a general preference for the
greater good option.
Maternal moral preferences were highly consistent with
the response pattern in the existing literature (Mikhail, 2007,
2009), underlining that our child versions captured the deontic
status of the original scenarios. Overall, children responded
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very similar to adult participants in this study and the
former studies with adult participants. However, different to
a former study on children’s moral judgments (Pellizzoni
et al., 2010), preschool children generated somewhat more
utilitarian judgments in the Footbridge dilemma. Additionally,
our data suggest that preschoolers make use of the Doctrine
of the Double Effect but, different to adults, they do not
judge according to the Contact Principle. This is indicated
by more utilitarian responses in the Bystander compared
to the Drop Man dilemma, but no significant difference
between the Footbridge and the Drop Man scenario, where
the only difference lies in the physical contact used to
shove the kid from the bridge. Different to adults, this
suggests that the Contact Principle is not yet in effect
in preschoolers. Furthermore, children rather advocated for
intervention in the Implied Consent dilemma to prevent the
kid from greater harm. Hence, preschoolers, just as adults,
differentiate between gradual harm and consider it morally
more permissible to actively hurt a person in order to prevent
that person from greater harm than to omit this act. It
is noteworthy that the Implied Consent dilemma is one
of two dilemmas where moral preferences between mothers
and children are nearly identical and where comparisons do
not reach significance. This is also true for the Bystander
Dilemma where both mothers and children show a clear
tendency for the utilitarian option. Furthermore, a clear majority
of the children rated the invulnerability of a threatened
protagonist as more important than saving desirable toys.
This suggests that preschoolers already accurately distinguish
between the invulnerability of much sought-after objects and
the invulnerability of persons. Still, more than one third of
all children advocated to save the toys in the Expensive
Equipment Dilemma, while only two mothers did so. This
indicates that more than one third of the children take into
account children rather getting slightly injured than desirable
toys getting destroyed. In contrast, almost all mothers advocated
that children remain physically unharmed and that the toys
get destroyed.
Children’s explanations made clear that they understood
the stories and anticipated the consequences of each decision.
The majority of these explanations focus on “saving the one
person’s life” or alternatively “saving the toys”. We thus consider
it unlikely that these responses are based on methodological
artifacts. Interestingly, despite the more utilitarian responses
in children compared to mothers in some of the scenarios,
developmental trajectories pointed to even more utilitarian
intuitions, indicated by an increase in utilitarian tendencies
with age, for the Footbridge, the Drop Man, and the Implied
Consent dilemma. Consequently, the agreement within these
scenarios would decrease with age since mothers show clear non-
utilitarian preferences in these dilemma. The control scenarios
indicate that children understood the threat of the ball and the
consequences of their action, opting for a costless rescue. In the
Disproportional Death scenario, a clear majority advocated not
to act, which is in the expected direction, but somewhat less
clear than expected. Yet, both the children’s explanations and the
control questions give clear evidence that all children understood
the scenario.
Overall, our data show a strong correspondence of maternal
judgments to those of their children. This was indicated by
13.6% of the variance in children’s behavior explained by the
judgment of the mother and the agreement pattern permutation
test, which revealed that the specific mother–child dyad agreed to
a much higher degree (71.1%) than randomly assigned mother–
child dyads (57.5%). While this provides first clear evidence
that children judge moral dilemmas like their mothers, it raises
the intriguing question how moral intuitions are transmitted
between mother and child. One possibility is that the way mothers
structure morally relevant situations to their children shapes
children moral intuitions from early in development, similar
to findings about early concepts of helping behavior (Köster
et al., 2015, 2016). However, one could speculate that another
viable option might be genetic factors, as indicated by a study
that identified genetic variants related to participant’s moral
judgments (Walter et al., 2012). The influences identified here
are rather strong, given that we only considered the mother
(i.e., the moral judgment of the father and close others may
also have an influence) and given that the trolley scenarios
assess rather abstract moral concepts, which are not close to
daily life scenarios. Thus it may also be the case that both
socialization and genetic factors play a critical role for the
development of moral intuitions, informing the developmental
system underlying children’s early socio-cognitive development
(Köster and Kärtner, 2019). This is also noteworthy from a
theoretical point of view since the UMG advocates notice that
there is, at least to some degree, socially transmitted moral
diversity; although, they are mute on the mechanisms that enable
the development of moral diversity (Mikhail, 2012), p168ff]. In
our perspective, the mother–child agreement found in the present
study may provide a link between the UMG and the claim of
Haidt’s social intuitionist model of moral judgment, by showing
that inter-individual variation in moral judgments of children is
to some degree transmitted within the family.
For future research, it would be valuable to investigate
how moral values may be socialized, for example, by looking
at mother–child interactions when discussing moral dilemma
together (for a recent study into this direction, see Mammen
et al., 2019). It would also be valuable to extend the focus of
social influences beyond the family context and to combine
socialization studies with genetic analysis to get a better idea
about the mechanisms of intergenerational transmission of moral
judgments. Moreover, further research should elucidate, how
individual’s moral grammar develops over the lifespan (e.g., at
what age the Contact Principle develops), throughout the school
years, and which additional factors influence moral intuitions
throughout development.
To conclude, the findings support our main hypotheses
that children respond similar to moral dilemmas like their
mothers and make use of similar deontic principles. In this
way, the present study opens up interesting avenues for future
research, how moral preferences are socialized within the parent–
child interaction.
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